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Crafting an Asbestos Scheduled Compensation
Solution for Louisiana and the Nation
INTRODUCTION
“Have you been exposed to asbestos?” On a regular basis, our
television poses this question. Before we have time to formulate an
answer, we know that a website filled with information along with
a 1-800 hotline waits at the end of the commercial. Often, we shrug
these advertisements off as mere annoyances and assure ourselves
that somewhere, a lawyer is banking on a legal get-rich-quick
scheme. After the advertisement concludes, we ponder why
asbestos claims still exist, because asbestos’ health effects have not
plagued recent generations.
We fail to recognize, however, that these commercials are
merely the public façade of a problem facing courts across the
country. Asbestos not only affects those with one of its associated
health problems, but also all citizens, because society must bear the
substantial costs of litigating the claims of those injured by
asbestos. The cost of asbestos litigation has caused an amount of
medical and economic suffering never experienced under
American tort law.1 Asbestos litigation has left plaintiffs without
compensation, corporations without assets, courts with crowded
dockets, and litigators with hearty bank accounts.
Unfortunately, the solutions offered by state governments and
the federal government to reform asbestos litigation have been
ineffective.2 Recently, Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc. forced the
Louisiana Supreme Court to choose a solution for Louisiana’s
asbestos litigation crisis.3 Due to judicial constraints, however, the
court was unable to consider the myriad of other solutions
available in other states.4 Therefore, the court’s decision not only
failed to advance any solution to the asbestos litigation problem
but also worsened it.
The inability of the Louisiana Supreme Court to craft a proper
solution for Louisiana’s asbestos litigation problem requires
legislative action. This Comment seeks to remedy the asbestos
Copyright 2012, by BRITTAN J. BUSH.
1. See discussion infra Part I (discussing the history of the asbestos litigation
crisis).
2. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the pros and cons of consolidation
and medical criteria statutes as a solution to the asbestos litigation crisis).
3. Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 16 So. 3d 1065 (La. 2009).
4. See discussion infra Part II (explaining the use of asbestos case
consolidation and medical criteria statutes as solutions to the asbestos litigation
crisis).
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litigation crisis by formulating a state-administered scheduled
compensation model that balances the interests of asbestos
plaintiffs, defendants, and attorneys. Part I lays out the history of
asbestos and its accompanying litigation and explains the
jurisprudence behind Louisiana’s asbestos litigation crisis. Part II
examines the pros and cons of the solutions offered by other state
legislatures to combat the asbestos litigation problem. Part III
analyzes why a state-administered compensation schedule that
incorporates provisions from the 2006 Fairness in Asbestos Injury
Resolution Act and the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act fairly
balances the interests of asbestos plaintiffs, defendants, and
attorneys.5 Part V concludes by arguing that the Louisiana
Legislature, as well as other state legislatures, should enact a
scheduled compensation plan for asbestos injuries.
I. THE ASBESTOS PROBLEM
The asbestos problem began when asbestos transformed from a
miracle fiber into an occupational hazard that ravaged society.
Asbestos litigation costs negatively affect not only asbestos
plaintiffs but also defendants and the judicial system. In Louisiana,
courts split on whether to adjudicate asbestos claims in the
workers’ compensation or tort system. The Louisiana Supreme
Court recently resolved this split and sent Louisiana courts down a
path of increased asbestos litigation costs for plaintiffs, defendants,
and the State.
A. The Miracle Fiber
Asbestos is a group of six different naturally occurring fibrous
minerals.6 Chrysotile, also known as white asbestos, was the
primary form of commercial asbestos throughout the United States
until the Environmental Protection Agency largely banned the use
of asbestos in 1989.7 Like other forms of asbestos, chrysotile does
5. See Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006, S. 3274, 109th
Cong. (2006); LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1299.41 (2010); see also discussion infra Part
III (explaining how a state administered compensation scheduled incorporating
provisions from the FAIR Act and the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act presents
a solution for Louisiana’s asbestos litigation crisis).
6. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE
FOR ASBESTOS (2001) (noting the six different types of asbestos: amosite,
chrysotile, crocidolite, tremolite, actinolite, and anthophyllite).
7. Id. (noting that although chrysotile was the primary form of commercial
asbestos, amosite and crocidolite were also widely used); 40 C.F.R. § 763.160–
.179 (2011) (largely banning the commercial use of asbestos in the United States).
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not evaporate or dissolve in water and is resistant to thermal,
chemical, and biological degradation.8 The durability of asbestos
led to its incorporation in a variety of manufactured products,
building materials, friction products, and heat resistant fabrics.9
With all of its positive characteristics, asbestos became known as
“the miracle fiber.”10
The miracle fiber became an occupational nightmare for tort
law systems throughout the United States. In the early twentieth
century, medical professionals began to recognize fibrosis in the
lungs of factory workers.11 The common link between victims of
the disease was exposure to asbestos within factories.12 In 1930,
medical professionals discovered that inhaled asbestos fibers
settled between the air cells of the lungs and caused scar tissue to
develop.13 This condition became known as asbestosis and was
recognized as an occupational hazard for those working with
asbestos.14 Asbestosis results in breathing difficulties, fatigue, and,
in serious cases, right ventricle failure.15
The medical problems associated with asbestos did not end
with asbestosis. Factory workers exposed to asbestos soon
exhibited signs of lung cancer.16 In the 1940s, British and
American doctors began seriously examining the link between
asbestosis and lung cancer.17 Their studies revealed three major
findings: (1) the large number of cases involving asbestos workers
with lung cancer originating in the lower lobes of the lungs, (2) the
latency period between exposure to asbestos and the development
of cancer, and (3) the large number of asbestosis victims also
suffering from lung cancer upon autopsy.18 The findings comprised
the earliest epidemiological support for the link between asbestos

8. U.S. DEP’T OF
FOR ASBESTOS (2001).

HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE

9. Id.
10. MARYLAND DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, FACT SHEET ON ASBESTOS (2010),
available at http://www.mde.state.md.us/Programs/Air/FactsaboutAsbestos/Pages/
index.aspx.
11. BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL & LEGAL ASPECTS 7 (2d. ed.
1986).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 10–11.
14. Id. at 9.
15. THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 470 (Merck Research
Laboratories, 18th ed. 2006) [hereinafter MERCK].
16. CASTLEMAN, supra note 11, at 40.
17. Id. at 39.
18. BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL & LEGAL ASPECTS 113 (3d.
ed. 1990).
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and cancer.19 It was not until the mid-1950s, however, that any
consensus regarding the carcinogenic properties of asbestos was
established.20
Asbestos’ most sinister health effect is mesothelioma, an
incurable malignant cancer.21 The most common form of the
disease is pleural mesothelioma, and it accounts for 90% of
mesothelioma diagnoses.22 Pleural mesothelioma results in pleural
thickening that encases a victim’s lungs.23 Pleural thickening
causes chest pain, weight loss, fluid buildup in the abdomen, blood
clotting, anemia, and bowel obstruction.24 Workers exposed to
asbestos have a 10% chance of developing mesothelioma, and its
average latency period is 30 to 50 years.25 Upon diagnosis,
mesothelioma is a virtual death sentence with an average survival
time of 8 to 15 months.26 The primary care given to its victims is
simply to relieve pain and suffering.27
Asbestos’ deadly health problems created the largest mass
personal injury tort in history.28 Asbestos litigation will eventually
cost nearly $265 billion,29 which surpasses the litigation costs for
tobacco and Agent Orange.30 Of the $70 billion spent on asbestos
litigation since the first asbestos lawsuit, plaintiffs recovered $29
billion compared to legal counsels’ $41 billion benefit.31 When
compared to the $13 billion collected by litigators in tobacco’s
$246 billion litigation, the disparity between asbestos litigation
costs and other mass torts is startling.32 This disparity signals an
inherent problem in the judicial system’s adjudication of asbestos
claims.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 144.
21. MERCK, supra note 15, at 471.
22. Id.
23. Id. Pleural thickening affects the membrane covering the pleural cavity
which protects human lungs.
24. NAT’L CANCER INST., ASBESTOS EXPOSURE AND CANCER RISK (2009),
available at http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/asbestos.
25. MERCK, supra note 15, at 471.
26. Id. at 472.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS &
COMPENSATION (2004); Michelle J. White, Asbestos and the Future of Mass Torts,
18 J. ECON. PERSP. 183 (2004).
29. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 28, at vii.
30. White, supra note 28, at 192 (noting the total costs of Agent Orange
litigation ($180 million) and tobacco litigation ($246 billion)).
31. Id. at 195 (outlining the distribution of asbestos litigation costs among
plaintiffs ($29 billion), their attorneys ($20 billion), and defense counsel ($21
billion)).
32. Id. at 192.
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The large number of asbestos defendants causes the disparity
between the costs of asbestos litigation and other mass torts.
Asbestos litigation has involved an unprecedented number of
defendants. Plaintiffs have filed more than 730,000 suits against
more than 8,400 defendants.33 There are 400 times more asbestos
defendants than the combined number of defendants in the
litigation over Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, breast implants, Fen
Phen, and tobacco.34
Asbestos litigation costs have taken a toll on major asbestos
manufacturers and their customers. In the 1980s, companies facing
massive asbestos liability began filing for bankruptcy in droves
because of rising litigation costs from asbestos claims.35 As of
2007, seventy-eight companies had filed for bankruptcy protection
due to asbestos litigation costs.36 Bankruptcy protection, however,
is utilized not only by major asbestos manufacturers but also
nontraditional asbestos defendants with primary business interests
in shipbuilding, flooring, and automotive part manufacturing.37
Most asbestos bankruptcies establish a bankruptcy trust to

33. Michelle J. White, Asbestos Litigation: Procedural Innovations and
Forum Shopping, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 365 (2006). For a further discussion of the
rise in asbestos claims see CARROLL ET. AL, supra note 28, at 22–30.
34. See White, supra note 28, at 192 (comparing the differences in plaintiff,
defendant, and attorney compensation statistics between asbestos, Agent Orange,
Dalkon Shield, breast implant, Fen-Phen, tobacco, lead, firearm, and fast-food
litigation).
35. Mark D. Plevin et al., Where Are They Now, Part Four: A Continuing
History of the Companies that have Sought Bankruptcy Protection Due to
Asbestos Claims, MEALEY’S ASBESTOS BANKR. REP. 8 (Feb. 2007) [hereinafter
Plevin, Where Are They Now?] (showing companies filing for bankruptcy
protection due to asbestos litigation costs as of February 2007). For a further
discussion of bankruptcies associated with asbestos see Eric D. Green et al.,
Prepackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: Down But Not Out, 63 N.Y.U ANN. SURV.
AM. LAW. 727 (2008); Douglas G. Smith, Resolution of Mass Torts in the
Bankruptcy System, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1613 (2008); Mark D. Plevin et al.,
Pre-Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: A Flawed Solution, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 883
(2003) [hereinafter Plevin, Pre-Packaged].
36. Plevin, Where are They Now?, supra note 35.
37. Id. I use the term “traditional asbestos defendants” to describe companies
with a primary business interest in incorporating asbestos into products and
asbestos mining. Johns-Manville, Philadelphia Asbestos Corp, and Lake Asbestos
of Quebec, Ltd. are examples of traditional asbestos defendants. The term
“nontraditional asbestos defendants” is used to describe companies who used
products containing asbestos in their normal course of business. Nontraditional
asbestos defendants do not actively incorporate asbestos into a product. The term
includes companies with a primary business outside of asbestos mining and
incorporation.
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compensate asbestos claims.38 Unfortunately, asbestos bankruptcy
trusts are often quickly depleted and fail to compensate plaintiffs
properly.39
Mass asbestos bankruptcies hinder a plaintiff’s ability to seek
recovery against a single traditional asbestos defendant.40
Therefore, plaintiffs are now suing dozens of nontraditional
asbestos defendants to garner the recovery they normally would
have received from a single traditional defendant.41 Often,
nontraditional defendants have exposed their plaintiffs to asbestos
only in extremely small quantities.42 The nontraditional defendant
phenomenon increased the number of defendants in asbestos
litigation and poses difficult causation and damage allocation
determinations for the courts.43
Asbestos was once the miracle fiber. But, the mix of asbestos
exposure to more than 27 million individuals, asbestos’ dire health
effects, and rising litigation costs destroyed asbestos’ miraculous
appeal.44 Plaintiffs now face a litigation scheme where
compensation is only available by suing dozens of defendants, and
defendants must sacrifice their own economic well-being to litigate
asbestos claims. What was once the miracle fiber is now nothing
more than a nightmare.
B. The Louisiana Problem
Until recently, Louisiana possessed a unique problem in
modern day asbestos litigation. Throughout the state, the Louisiana
circuit courts of appeal waged judicial warfare over the
applicability of the 1952 Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act’s
Occupational Disease Amendment (the Amendment) to individuals
affected by mesothelioma.45 At the time, the circuit courts were
38. See Plevin, Pre-Packaged, supra note 35, at 888 (noting that asbestos
bankruptcies are often filed under an expedited bankruptcy procedure under
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and establish a bankruptcy trust to
compensate future asbestos claims).
39. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L. J. 1879, 1895 n.42 (1991)
(describing the rapid depletion of the Johns Manville asbestos bankruptcy trust
after only 25,000 of more than 140,000 claims were adjudicated).
40. See White, supra note 33, at 369.
41. Id.
42. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION xxix (2005).
43. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing the need for plaintiffs to utilize
nontraditional tort theories to prove causation of an asbestos injury in the tort
system).
44. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 42, at 19; White, supra note 33, at 365.
45. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1031.1 (1952).
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split on whether recovery for mesothelioma damages was
exclusively under the Amendment or Louisiana tort law.46
In 1952, the Louisiana legislature adopted the Occupational
Disease Amendment to the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation
Act.47 The Amendment responded to the extension of workers’
compensation coverage across the country at the time.48 Initially,
the Amendment was a general coverage statute providing recovery
for all occupational diseases under Louisiana’s workers’
compensation system.49 The legislature modified the Amendment,
however, and adopted a scheduled workers’ compensation statute
covering only diseases enumerated under the statute.50 In 1975, the
Louisiana legislature changed the Amendment and enacted a
general coverage statute.51
The Amendment provided coverage for poisoning or diseases
resulting from contact with 16 classifications of elemental
compounds.52 It also provided coverage for specific diseases such
as asbestosis, silicosis, dermatosis, and pneumoconiosis.53 Prior to
the Amendment’s enactment, occupational disease victims sought
recovery against their employers in tort.54 The Amendment’s
exclusivity clause, however, barred any action in tort against one’s
employer for occupational diseases covered in the Amendment.55
Therefore, employees under the Amendment were unable to seek a
remedy in Louisiana tort law for asbestosis, silicosis, dermatosis,
46. Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 16 So. 3d 1065, 1071 (La. 2009) (noting
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision to grant writs to resolve the split among
the Louisiana circuit courts of appeal regarding mesothelioma coverage under the
Amendment). Compare Johnson v. Ashland Oil Co., 684 So. 2d 1156 (La. Ct.
App. 1st 1996); Gautreaux v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 694 So. 2d 977, 979 (La. Ct. App.
4th 1996) (noting the exclusion of asbestos injuries other than asbestos under the
Amendment), with Adams v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd., 914 So. 2d 1177, 1183 (La. Ct.
App. 2d 2005); Brunet v. Avondale Indus., 772 So. 2d 974, 984 (La. Ct. App. 5th
2005), reh’g denied, 2000 La. App. LEXIS 3470 (2000) (noting the Second and
Fifth Circuit’s inclusion of asbestos injuries other than asbestosis under the
Amendment).
47. WEX S. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW &
PRACTICE § 218 (Supp. 1964) (noting the practice in other states of extending
worker’s compensation coverage).
48. Id.
49. H. B. 1098, 1952 Leg., 19th Reg. Sess. (La. 1952).
50. MALONE, supra note 47, § 218 (explaining the Louisiana legislature’s
decision to enact a scheduled worker’s compensation statute).
51. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1031.1 (1975).
52. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1031.1(A)(1)(a) (1952).
53. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1031.1(A)(2–6) (1952).
54. MALONE, supra note 47, § 218 (explaining the general practice of
employees seeking recovery for occupational diseases against their employers
under the tort system).
55. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1031.1(F) (1952).
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and pneumoconiosis. In addition, the Amendment barred suits for
diseases and poisoning caused by substances within the 16
elemental-compound classifications.56
The Louisiana circuit courts of appeal split over the
interpretation of the Amendment’s coverage and exclusivity
clauses. For years, Louisiana courts held that the Amendment
covered diseases not specifically enumerated in the statute. Some
of the non-enumerated diseases held to be within the Amendment’s
parameters included bullous emphysema caused by spray paint
exposure, pneumoconiosis, pneumonitis from a chemical spray,
lung injuries from spray-on detergent and sandblasting, and
trinitrotoluene (TNT) toxemia from TNT dust.57
The circuit courts also explicitly addressed asbestos injury
coverage under the Amendment. The first circuit in Johnson v.
Ashland Oil Co. held mesothelioma was not compensable under
the Amendment.58 Because mesothelioma was not listed as a
covered disease, and asbestos was not specifically listed as a toxic
substance under the Amendment, the Johnson court reasoned that
the only remedy for asbestos injuries other than asbestosis was in
tort.59
In Gautreaux v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., a two-judge
plurality on a five-judge panel in the fourth circuit held lung cancer
caused by asbestos was not compensable under the Amendment.60
Although the plurality reasoned that lung cancer was not a
specifically listed disease under the statute, it was willing to grant
coverage under the Amendment for diseases caused by substances
56. Id.
57. See Austin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 79 So. 2d 383 (La. Ct. App. 1955)
(holding that toxemia from exposure to TNT dust was compensable under the
Amendment); Bernard v. La. Wild Life & Fisheries Comm., 152 So. 2d 114 (La.
Ct. App. 1963) (holding that employee’s injuries from exposure to a chemical
spray were compensable under the Amendment); Riley v. Avondale Shipyards,
305 So. 2d 742 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that injuries from employee’s
inhalation of detergent solution were compensable under the Amendment);
Zeringue v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 271 So. 2d 613 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (holding
that an employee’s contraction of bullous emphysema from exposure to spray
painting products was compensable under the Amendment).
58. See Johnson v. Ashland Oil, 684 So. 2d 1156 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1996). In
Rando, the Louisiana Supreme Court cited Terrance as the case stating the First
Circuit’s interpretation of the Amendment. Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 16 So.
3d 1065, 1074 (La. 2009). However, the court in Terrance relied on the reasoning
from Johnson in its ruling. Terrance v. Dow Chem. Co., 971 So. 2d 1058 (La. Ct.
App. 1st 2007).
59. Johnson, 684 So. 2d at 1158.
60. Gautreaux v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 694 So. 2d 977, 979 (La. Ct. App. 4th
1996).
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not specifically listed in the statute.61 The court, nonetheless, ruled
that asbestos did not meet one of the elemental-compound
classifications under the Amendment.62 In addition, the
determination regarding asbestos’ elemental makeup was made
without any expert testimony.63
The Gautreaux plurality reached its decision over a strong
dissent. The dissenting justices held that asbestos was a covered
substance under the elemental classifications in the Amendment.64
The dissenters reasoned that the Amendment’s language allowing
for coverage of diseases caused by oxygen and its compounds
included all compounds containing oxygen, and since asbestos
contains oxygen, its diseases are covered under the Amendment.65
The dissent also stressed the agreement of assured compensation
by an employer in exchange for a plaintiff’s right to a remedy in
tort underlying workers’ compensation.66 Therefore, liberal
coverage interpretations must be accompanied by liberal
exclusivity clause interpretations to preserve the workers’
compensation system.67 Finally, the dissenting opinion stated that
the legislature likely did not mean to include asbestosis while
excluding other diseases caused by asbestos.68
The second circuit in Adams v. Asbestos Corp. refused to
follow the reasoning in Gautreaux and held mesothelioma was a
compensable disease under the Amendment.69 The court in Adams
reasoned that asbestos’ elemental composition brought it under the
elemental-compound classifications in the Amendment.70 It also
reasoned that the legislature would not intend for different
coverage for individuals with different diseases caused by the same
substance.71 Finally, the court stated that the legislature’s failure to
include mesothelioma as a specifically listed disease under the
Amendment was due to its lack of knowledge about mesothelioma
at the time of the Amendment’s passage.72

61. Id. at 978.
62. Id. at 979.
63. Id. (Culotta, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 980 (Byrnes, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (noting that a junior high level student would recognize that asbestos
was a compound containing oxygen).
66. Id. at 983.
67. Id. at 984.
68. Id.
69. Adams v. Asbestos Corp., 914 So. 2d 1177, 1183 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2005).
70. Id. at 1182.
71. Id. at 1183
72. Id.
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In Brunet v. Avondale Industries Inc., the fifth circuit held
asbestos-related diseases were covered by the Amendment.73 The
court reasoned that one must look to the elemental-compound
classifications within the Amendment if a particular disease is not
specifically listed.74 The majority also attacked the weak
procedural posture of Gautreaux.75 The majority criticized the use
of the Gautreaux decision as binding precedent given that its
plurality opinion garnered support from only two judges on a fivejudge panel.76 Finally, the court stressed the importance of the fact
that the legislature included asbestosis in its list of specifically
covered diseases.77 The majority argued that asbestosis’ inclusion
was likely a signal to cover all diseases caused by asbestosis’
causative agent, asbestos.78 The court stated that a liberal coverage
interpretation would further the policy of workers’ compensation
by relieving the economic burden of injured workers while
diffusing the costs of doing so in the channels of commerce.79
The split among the Louisiana circuit courts of appeal shows
that the systems of workers’ compensation and asbestos tort
recovery are inherently at odds with one another. Although
workers’ compensation guarantees quick and modest compensation
for injuries, asbestos plaintiffs frequently want to avoid the system
to gain larger recovery in tort.80 The theoretical battle between
workers’ compensation and asbestos tort recovery presented the
Louisiana Supreme Court with a major question in Rando v. Anco
Insulations Inc.81 The court was given the option of placing
asbestos injury claims into a low-cost and efficient workers’
compensation system or shifting asbestos claims into the Louisiana
tort system.82 Although the effects of the court’s decision have yet
to be seen, Rando drastically changed asbestos litigation in
Louisiana and set the stage for Louisiana’s asbestos litigation
crisis.

73. Brunet v. Avondale Indus., 772 So. 2d 974, 984 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2000).
74. Id. at 982.
75. Id. at 980.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 983.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Lori J. Khan, Untangling the Insurance Fibers in Asbestos Litigation:
Toward a National Solution to the Asbestos Injury Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REV. 195,
228 (1993).
81. See Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 16 So. 3d 1065 (La. 2009).
82. Id. at 1071.
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C. Louisiana Falters: The Rando v. Anco Insulations Decision
In September 2005, Ray Rando, a retired pipefitter, was
diagnosed with mesothelioma.83 In November of 2005, Rando
initiated a tort suit against his former employers, alleging asbestos
exposure during his time as a pipefitter from 1970–1972.84 As a
result of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s holding in Austin v. Abney
Mills Inc., the trial court applied the law in place during the time of
Rando’s significant exposure to asbestos.85
The trial court dismissed defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, arguing that Rando’s disease was covered under the
Amendment and barred by the Amendment’s exclusivity clause.86
The court held asbestos was not a disease-causing substance and
that mesothelioma was not an enumerated disease under the
Amendment.87 After trial, the jury found in favor of Rando and
awarded general damages of $2.8 million and $402,000 in special
damages.88
The defendants appealed the trial court’s decision, which was
upheld by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal. 89 The first
circuit followed Terrance v. Dow Chemical Co., which held that
the Amendment did not include mesothelioma as an enumerated
disease or asbestos as a disease-causing substance.90 The court also
upheld the trial court’s causation and damages determinations.91
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs to resolve the
circuit split over mesothelioma and asbestos coverage under the
Amendment.92 The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the first
circuit’s ruling and held that mesothelioma was not an enumerated
disease under the Amendment.93 In addition, the Court held that

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.; see Austin v. Abney Mills Inc., 824 So. 2d 1137 (La. 2002) (accepting
the significant exposure theory in Louisiana asbestos cases and requiring the
application of the law in place at the time of an individual’s significant exposure to
asbestos).
86. Rando, 16 So. 3d at 1073.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1074.
90. Id.; see also Terrance v. Dow Chem. Co., 971 So. 2d 1058, 1066 (La. Ct.
App. 1st 2007), writ denied, 970 So. 2d 534 (La. 2007).
91. Rando, 16 So. 3d at 1074.
92. Id.; see also supra Part I.B. (discussing the split within the Louisiana
circuit courts of appeal over asbestos injury coverage under the Amendment).
93. Rando, 16 So. 3d at 1079, 1094.
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asbestos was not a disease-causing agent under the elementalcompound classifications in the Amendment.94
The Rando majority used the canons of interpretation from the
Louisiana Civil Code to interpret the Amendment’s coverage.95
While the majority agreed that the Amendment broadened the
scope of workers’ compensation, it held that mesothelioma was not
a covered disease under a clear and unambiguous interpretation.96
The court argued that the language stating that “[a]n occupational
disease shall only include those diseases hereinafter listed” barred
coverage for mesothelioma, because mesothelioma was not
specifically stated in the statute.97 The majority also reasoned that
an interpretation including mesothelioma would have been outside
of the legislature’s intent because mesothelioma was not
recognized as a disease caused by asbestos exposure in 1952.98 The
majority rejected the argument that asbestosis’ inclusion in the
Amendment signaled the legislature’s intent to cover all diseases
caused by asbestos exposure due to the limited knowledge of
asbestos’ health effects in 1952.99
The elemental-compound classifications in the Amendment
provided compensation for “diseases resulting from contact with . .
. oxygen, nitrogen, carbon, and their compounds . . . [and] metals
other than lead and their compounds.”100 Although the majority did
state that asbestos was an oxygen and metal compound, it rejected
the argument that asbestos was a disease-causing substance under
any of the elemental-compound classifications in the
Amendment.101 The majority also reasoned that Louisiana’s
adoption of a general coverage workers’ compensation statute in
1975 limited the scope of the elemental-compound classifications
in the Amendment.102 The court determined that a liberal
94. Id. at 1080.
95. Id. at 1075; see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2009) (“When a law is clear
and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the
law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search
of the intent of the legislature.”); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 10 (2009) (“When the
language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as
having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.”); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 11 (2009) (“The words of a law must be given their generally prevailing
meaning. Words of art and technical terms must be given their technical meaning
when the law involves a technical matter.”).
96. Rando, 16 So. 3d at 1079.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1080.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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interpretation of the elemental-compound classifications would
compensate diseases resulting from exposure to over 90% of all
elemental compounds known to man.103 The majority concluded
that a liberal interpretation rendered language in the statute
superfluous.104
Justice Victory’s dissent attacked the majority’s holding that
asbestos was not a disease-causing agent under the elementalcompound classifications in the Amendment.105 Justice Victory
argued that the majority’s characterization of asbestos as an
“oxygen or metal compound” required its inclusion under the
Amendment because the Amendment covered diseases resulting
from oxygen and metal compounds.106 The dissent also reasoned
that the remedial policy of workers’ compensation supported a
liberal interpretation of the Amendment that includes asbestos as a
disease causing agent.107
Justice Victory also argued that the majority’s interpretation
was not compatible with the policy behind workers’
compensation.108 He thought the majority’s interpretation limited
the amount of covered diseases to a “fairly narrow and arbitrary
list.”109 The dissent found that coverage of asbestosis and not
mesothelioma established a compensation system where coworkers exposed to the same disease-causing agent received
different coverage due to the agent’s disease manifestation.110 The
exclusion of certain asbestos disease manifestations was therefore
contrary to the goal of the workers’ compensation scheme.111
Finally, the dissent argued that the legislature’s inclusion of
coverage limitations throughout the Amendment, such as the
exclusion of compensation for tuberculosis, supported a liberal
interpretation of the Amendment allowing coverage for diseases
not specifically excluded.112
The Rando decision shows that Louisiana is not immune to the
burdens of asbestos litigation. While the Louisiana Supreme Court
could have shifted all asbestos claims into an efficient workers’
compensation system, the court’s decision placed asbestos in the
103. Id. at 1080 n.9.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1096 (Victory, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1099.
108. Id. at 1095.
109. Id. at 1101 n.6 (quoting Gautreaux v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 694 So. 2d 977,
983 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (Byrnes, J., dissenting)).
110. Id. at 1103.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 1103 n.7.

770

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

tort system, which has historically failed to adjudicate asbestos
claims efficiently. Therefore, Louisiana must search for a solution
to its impending asbestos litigation crisis.
II. SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling in Rando opened the
floodgates for asbestos litigation in Louisiana by requiring asbestos
plaintiffs in the second and fifth circuits to seek recovery in the tort
system.113 Although the Louisiana judiciary has yet to study the
effect of the Rando decision on asbestos filings in Louisiana, the
decision is likely to increase asbestos claims in the state.
Therefore, Louisiana must craft a solution that adequately
adjudicates asbestos claims while limiting litigation costs.
Louisiana could look to other states that have enacted procedural
mechanisms, including consolidation and medical criteria statutes,
to efficiently resolve asbestos litigation costs.
A. The Consolidation Solution
Asbestos case consolidation occurs throughout the country.114
In consolidation, claims are grouped together when they possess a
common question of law or fact.115 The specific purpose behind
asbestos consolidation is the quick and efficient resolution of
asbestos cases.116
In theory, consolidation has several positive effects. The
joinder of numerous claims involving similar injuries and
questions of fact promotes judicial efficiency by streamlining the
discovery and liability portions of a case.117 Furthermore,
consolidation gives jurisdictions facing massive amounts of

113. Id. at 1074.
114. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Asbestos Litigation and Tort Law: Trends,
Ethics, & Solutions: Addressing the “Elephantine Mass” of Asbestos Cases:
Consolidation Versus Inactive Dockets (Pleural Registries) and Case
Management Plans That Defer Claims Filed by the Non-Sick, 31 PEPP. L. REV.
271, 281 (2003) (noting the practice of asbestos consolidation in Virginia and
West Virginia); Victor E. Schwartz & Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Law of
Unintended Consequences in Asbestos Litigation: How Efforts to Streamline the
Litigation Have Fueled More Claims, 71 MISS. L. J. 531, 543 (2002) (noting the
practice of asbestos consolidation in Mississippi and West Virginia).
115. See Gene R. Shreve, Reform Aspirations of the Complex Litigation
Project, 54 LA. L. REV. 1139, 1142 (1994).
116. Id. at 1141.
117. Schwartz, supra note 114, at 281–84 (discussing the perception that
consolidation promotes efficiency).
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asbestos claims a mechanism to lower the litigation costs of
plaintiffs, defendants, and the courts.118
The practical effects of consolidation, however, negate its
theoretical positives.119 Modern asbestos consolidations bear little
resemblance to the first consolidations of nearly 30 years ago. The
first consolidations normally involved a small number of cases,
usually around five, with very similar claims and questions of
liability.120 The rise in asbestos litigation, however, expanded
consolidations into actions with hundreds and even thousands of
plaintiffs.121 In addition, large consolidations often involve
plaintiffs with dissimilar claims and liability questions against
dozens of unrelated defendants.122
Defendants in mass consolidations face heavy discovery
burdens that require investigations of thousands of dissimilar
claims against multiple defendants along with massive potential
liability costs.123 The risk of massive liability and high litigation
costs often forces defendants to settle consolidated asbestos
claims.124 Consolidations are now characterized as a form of
judicial blackmail because of the increased pressure on defendants
to settle.125 In addition, judges, facing hundreds to thousands of
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999: Hearing on
H.R. 1283 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 186, 189 (1999)
(prepared statement of William N. Eskridge, Jr., Professor, Yale Law School),
available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju62442.000/hju
6242_0f.htm.
121. Id.; State ex rel Mobil Corp. v. Gaughan, 565 S.E. 2d 793, 794 (W. Va.
2002) (Maynard, J., concurring) (noting that a West Virginia asbestos
consolidation involved thousands of plaintiffs; 20 or more defendants; hundreds of
different work sites located in a number of different states; dozens of different
occupations and circumstances of exposure; dozens of different products with
different formulations, applications, and warnings; several different diseases;
numerous different claims at different stages of development; and at least nine
different law firms, with differing interests, representing the various plaintiffs.
Additionally, the challenged conduct spanned the better part of six decades.).
122. See explanatory parenthetical, supra note 121.
123. See Mobil Corp., 563 S.E. 2d at 421 (Maynard, J., concurring).
124. See, e.g., Cosey v. E.D. Bullard Co., Civ. No. 95-0069 (Miss. Cir. Ct.
Jefferson County Sept. 16, 1998). In a mass asbestos consolidation case, the judge,
after the trial of 12 plaintiffs, pressured defendants to settle the cases of nearly
1700 other plaintiffs. See also Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, A Letter to the
Nation’s Trial Judges: How the Focus on Efficiency is Hurting You and Innocent
Victims in Asbestos Liability Cases, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 247, 255 (2000).
125. See Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1421 (noting that although class actions and
mass consolidations are different, both still pose the risk of creating a bargaining
scale more favorable to plaintiffs).
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claims, often dispense with discovery procedures for many claims
in the spirit of judicial efficiency.126
Consolidation also negatively impacts asbestos plaintiffs. Mass
asbestos consolidations often group plaintiffs with serious asbestos
injuries, such as mesothelioma and lung cancer, with plaintiffs
claiming only breathing difficulty or no physical impairment at
all.127 Unimpaired plaintiffs with minor or no asbestos injury other
than exposure now account for a large number of asbestos claims
filed throughout the country.128 Knowing that defendants facing
massive liability are more likely to settle, attorneys are more
inclined to join unimpaired plaintiffs to consolidated asbestos
cases.129 Because consolidation encourages large settlements, the
majority of asbestos recovery in consolidations is going to
individuals without a serious asbestos injury.130
Consolidation risks diverting resources away from truly injured
claimants and into the hands of unimpaired plaintiffs. Public policy
suggests that the tort system should be directed toward holding
defendants who are true wrongdoers responsible and compensating
only plaintiffs who are truly injured.131 The consolidation method
fails to achieve this end and cannot be the proper solution to the
asbestos litigation crisis.
B. The Medical Criteria Statute Solution
As opposed to consolidation, medical criteria statutes represent
the strongest procedural stance against asbestos litigation costs.
Since 2004, Ohio, Georgia, Florida, Texas, Kansas, and South
Carolina have enacted medical criteria statutes.132 In addition,
courts in other states established inactive docket programs similar
to medical criteria statutes without statutory authorization.133 The
statutes establish an inactive docket, allowing only plaintiffs with
126. See Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 114, at 536; see also Schwartz &
Lober, supra note 124, at 258.
127. See Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 114, at 544.
128. Id. at 538.
129. See Matthew L. Cooper, Too Far or Not Far Enough?: Michigan
Supreme Court Administrative Order 2006-6 and Its Impact on Asbestos
Litigation in Michigan, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407, 418 (discussing the use of
asbestos consolidations by plaintiffs’ attorneys as leverage for mass asbestos
settlements); see also Schwartz et al., supra note 114, at 285.
130. Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 114, at 542.
131. Id. at 536.
132. Philip Zimmerly, The Answer is Blowing in Procedure: States Turn to
Medical Criteria and Inactive Dockets to Better Facilitate Asbestos Litigation, 59
ALA. L. REV. 771, 778 (2008).
133. Id.
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serious asbestos injuries to advance through the court system.134
Medical criteria statutes require plaintiffs to assert prima facie
evidence of a serious asbestos injury to gain court access.135
Claims that do not meet the prima facie evidence requirements are
dismissed or suspended until sufficient evidence of an injury is
presented.136 In addition, some states limit asbestos consolidation
and require asbestos claims to have a significant connection to the
jurisdiction.137 Medical criteria statutes and inactive docket
programs have limited asbestos filings in particular jurisdictions,
and New York, Texas, Mississippi, and Ohio have seen decreases
in asbestos claims between 35 and 90%.138
The success of medical criteria statutes led some scholars to
believe that the statutes are the solution to the asbestos litigation
crisis.139 Medical criteria statutes, however, are not a panacea to
the asbestos problem for several reasons. First, medical criteria
statutes fail to adjudicate valid asbestos injury claims through
procedural barriers.140 Second, retroactive application of the
statutes fails to preserve claims and reduce strategic behavior by
plaintiffs’ attorneys. Finally, medical criteria statutes do not limit
asbestos claims, but instead shift claims to other jurisdictions.141

134. See id. at 780.
135. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 774.204(1) (2007) (“Physical impairment of the
exposed person, to which asbestos or silica exposure was a substantial contributing
factor, is an essential element of an asbestos or silica claim.”); see also GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-14-4 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4902(a) (2006); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2307.92 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-135-50(A) (2007); TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 90.003(a)(1)(B) (Vernon 2007).
136. Zimmerly, supra note 132, at 780.
137. South Carolina’s statute specifically limits asbestos case consolidation
and case transfer within its state courts. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-135-20(A)(5)
(2006). Georgia and Florida require plaintiffs to be domiciled in the state or suffer
their injury due to some interaction with the state. See FLA. STAT. § 774.205
(2007); GA. CODE. ANN. § 51-14-9(a) (2007).
138. Mark A. Behrens, What’s New in Asbestos Litigation, 28 REV. LITIG. 501,
524 (2009) (noting the decrease in asbestos filings in states with a medical criteria
statute or inactive docket program).
139. See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens, Stewardship for the Sick: Preserving Assets
for Asbestos Victims Through Inactive Docket Programs, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1
(2001); Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts can do in the Face of the Never-ending
Asbestos Crisis, 71 MISS. L. J. 1 (2001).
140. See Jordana Mishory, Riding the Herd: Scores of South Florida Silicosis
Cases Are in Jeopardy After Fraud Allegations in Texas Bring Tough Judicial
Scrutiny, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., June 12, 2006, at 8 (noting legislators’
concerns that Florida’s medical criteria statute for asbestos and silicosis injuries
establishes too stringent a pleading standard for plaintiffs).
141. Behrens, supra note 138, at 539–541 (noting the increase in asbestos
claims in California, Delaware, and Illinois).
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While the effort to compensate only serious asbestos injury
claims is admirable, medical criteria statutes exclude plaintiffs
with minor injuries and the potential for future injuries through
procedural barriers.142 Stringent pleading standards requiring
extensive prima facie medical evidence of a serious asbestos injury
pose procedural difficulties for plaintiffs.143 At the pleading stage,
plaintiffs must show physical impairment to which asbestos
exposure was a significant contributing factor because claims for
economic asbestos injuries, like medical monitoring, are barred.144
Consequently, plaintiffs are now required, at the pleading stage, to
assert prima facie medical evidence showing causation of injuries,
with latency periods spanning several decades.145 The need to
assert prima facie evidence requires plaintiffs to acquire numerous
medical and employment records from their defendant–employers,
a practice normally reserved for the discovery process. 146 Because
discovery mechanisms do not attach after a case’s placement on an
inactive docket, the ability of plaintiffs to retrieve documents
detailing their work history and employers’ use of asbestos is
severely hindered.147
The exclusion of plaintiffs with only a minor asbestos injury
defeats the purpose of tort litigation. While some plaintiffs may be
at risk of death from lung cancer and mesothelioma, others suffer
from the increased costs associated with the need to monitor for a
potential asbestos illness or difficulty in breathing.148 While minor
asbestos injuries may not manifest into major health problems,
asbestos exposure can result in financial injuries that impact the
lives of victims.149 Furthermore, the tort system is in place to
142. Zimmerly, supra note 132, at 700 (explaining medical criteria statutes’
exclusion of minor asbestos injury claims).
143. Mishory, supra note 140 (noting that medical criteria statutes pose
procedural difficulties for plaintiffs in states with notice pleading).
144. Id.
145. Randy Maniloff, An Inactive Asbestos Docket: Understanding the Risks,
MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Apr. 16 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 10830999;
MERCK, supra note 15 (noting the latency periods for asbestos injuries).
146. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (noting how
the discovery and summary judgment process is used to shape the prima facie
elements and issues of a case).
147. Maniloff, supra note 145.
148. MERCK, supra note 15, at 470 (noting the wide range of possible asbestos
injuries).
149. See Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 431 (W. Va.
1999) (noting the important public health policy behind compensating individuals
with an increased need for medical monitoring due to the tortious act of another);
Ayers v. Jackson Tp., 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987) (noting that medical
monitoring recovery may enable early detection of a future health problem and
decrease the liability of future defendants).
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compensate not only plaintiffs with serious physical injuries but
also all plaintiffs injured by another, as well, including those only
suffering from minor physical and economic injuries.150 By
excluding claims for minor asbestos injuries, medical criteria
statutes produce many unadjudicated claims and uncompensated
plaintiffs.151
Medical criteria statutes also pose due process concerns as a
result of retroactivity provisions requiring plaintiffs who filed
claims prior to a medical criteria statute’s enactment to reassert
their claims showing prima facie medical evidence of an asbestos
injury.152 Florida, Georgia, and Ohio retroactively applied medical
criteria statutes to existing asbestos claims.153 Each jurisdiction’s
retroactivity provision was challenged in the court system. While
Ohio upheld its retroactivity provisions, courts in Florida and
Georgia declared retroactivity unconstitutional.154 However, both
interpretations present problems for states considering medical
criteria statutes as a solution to asbestos litigation.
First, medical criteria statutes provide an incentive for strategic
behavior by plaintiffs’ attorneys. Although legislation cannot
completely discourage strategic behavior, medical criteria statutes
encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys to flood courts with asbestos claims
prior to a medical criteria statute’s enactment to avoid the statute’s
stringent pleading requirements. For states not allowing
150. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (“Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened.”) (emphasis added).
151. See Schwartz & Lober, supra note 124, at 258 (explaining the rise in
unimpaired asbestos plaintiffs); Queena Sook Kim, G-I Holdings' Bankruptcy
Filing Cites Exposure in Asbestos Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2001, at B12.
152. See Maniloff, supra note 145.
153. See FLA. STAT. § 774.204 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-1 (2010);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.92 (LexisNexis 2010).
154. See Wilson v. AC&S Inc., 864 N.E.2d 682 (holding that retroactive
application of provisions in Ohio’s medical criteria statute did not burden an
invested right and could be applied to asbestos claims filed prior to the statute’s
enactment); but see Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Ferrante, 637 S.E.2d 659 (Ga.
2006) (holding that provisions of Georgia’s asbestos claims statute requiring
plaintiffs to produce evidence establishing that their exposure to asbestos was a
substantial contributing factor to their medical conditions affected plaintiffs’
substantive rights and could not retroactively be applied to their claims). See also
In re Asbestos Litigation, 933 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3rd Dist. 2006)
(holding that Florida’s “Asbestos and Silica Compensation Fairness Act” could
not be applied to plaintiffs suffering from nonmalignant asbestos injuries who had
received a trial date prior to the statute’s enactment); Williams v. American
Optical Corp., 985 So. 2d 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2008) (holding that that
Florida’s “Asbestos and Silica Compensation Fairness Act” cannot be
retroactively applied to prejudice or defeat causes of action already accrued and in
litigation).
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retroactivity, the result of this strategic behavior is a crippling mass
of asbestos cases remaining on their courts’ dockets.155 States
allowing retroactivity, however, risk destroying valid claims or
making claims dormant for a number of years. The catch-22
presented by retroactive application shows that simply dismissing
claims or placing them on an inactive docket is a fatal flaw within
medical criteria statutes because, under each approach, strategic
behavior is encouraged or claims are impeded. This problem
signals the need for a solution that reduces the benefits of strategic
behavior while still preserving valid injury claims.
Second, medical criteria statutes increase asbestos litigation in
other jurisdictions.156 By excluding vast amounts of claims in some
jurisdictions, asbestos litigation is growing in jurisdictions without
medical criteria statutes.157 Traditional asbestos havens such as
Texas and South Carolina are being replaced by jurisdictions more
hospitable to asbestos claims, and courts in California, Delaware,
and Illinois are experiencing a rise in nonresident asbestos
claims.158 The shift in asbestos litigation has even prompted
plaintiffs’ firms specializing in mass torts to establish offices in
states without medical criteria statues.159 Even though jurisdictions
with medical criteria statutes are experiencing a lower number of
asbestos filings, the asbestos problem still remains. The burdens of
asbestos litigation, however, must now be borne by fewer states
with an even greater concentration of asbestos claims than ever
before. Therefore, medical criteria statutes fail to curb asbestos

155. See Jordana Mishory, No Turning Back: Judge Rules Law that Required
Plaintiffs to Submit Medical Histories Can’t be Applied Retroactively, MIAMI
DAILY BUS. REV., Aug. 8, 2006, at 1 (noting the over 2,500 cases pending on the
Miami-Dade Circuit Court’s docket prior to the passage of Florida’s medical
criteria statute).
156. See discussion infra Part III. The failure of medical criteria statutes to
impact claims at the national level supports the need for federal asbestos tort
reform. Part III will discuss the failure of the federal government to pass such
legislation and call for a state solution that prevents the shifting of asbestos claims
to other jurisdictions by formulating a state-administered compensation schedule
that adequately reduces the need for plaintiffs’ attorneys to employ strategic
behavior and increase the asbestos litigation burden on other jurisdictions.
157. Behrens, supra note 138, at 539 (noting the increase in asbestos claims in
California, Delaware, and Illinois).
158. Id.; see also Victor E. Schwartz et al., Litigation Tourism Hurts
Californians, 21-20 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. ASB. 20 (2006) (noting that in
California over 30% of asbestos plaintiffs are nonresidents and lack any
connection to the forum). The term “traditional asbestos haven” is used to describe
jurisdictions that historically have been a popular forum for asbestos plaintiffs.
159. Cortney Fielding, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Turn to L.A. Courts for Asbestos
Litigation, DAILY J. (Los Angeles, Ca.), Feb. 27, 2009, at 1.
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litigation and instead encourage forum shopping by asbestos
plaintiffs.
Consolidation and medical criteria statutes do not adequately
resolve the asbestos litigation problem, and states must formulate
new remedies to counteract asbestos’ stranglehold on the judicial
system. These remedies should allow states to resolve asbestos
claims efficiently without sacrificing the interests of plaintiffs,
defendants, and other jurisdictions. One plan not yet enacted at a
state level may provide the necessary remedy: the adoption of a
scheduled asbestos compensation fund.
III. THE SCHEDULED COMPENSATION SOLUTION
The failure of medical criteria statutes and consolidation
signals the need for a national solution. Although the federal
government attempted to enact federal asbestos litigation reform
with the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act (FAIR Act),
political and business interests halted the act’s passage. Therefore,
the Louisiana legislature must reform asbestos litigation at the state
level. The Louisiana solution, however, must adequately balance
the interests of all parties in asbestos litigation and address the
criticisms that led to the FAIR Act’s failure. Louisiana can achieve
these ends by enacting a scheduled compensation plan that
incorporates the substantive provisions of FAIR Act under the
procedural framework of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act.
A. The Failed Federal Solution
In 1997, the United States Supreme Court called for an
administrative solution to the “elephantine mass” of asbestos
claims and litigation costs in the United States.160 In 2006, Senator
Arlen Specter, responding to the Supreme Court’s request,
proposed the FAIR Act to the United States Senate.161 The 2006
FAIR Act, at its core, would establish an administrative
compensation schedule providing recovery for individuals
160. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (describing
asbestos litigation as an “elephantine mass” that defies customary judicial
administration and requires national legislation); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (“[A] nationwide administrative claims processing
regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating
victims of asbestos exposure.”).
161. Elise Gelinas, Asbestos Fraud Should Lead to Fairness: Why Congress
Should Enact the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act, 69 MD. L. REV. 162,
168 (2009) (noting Congress’ failure to enact previous versions of the FAIR Act
and Senator Arlen Specter’s proposal of the 2006 version of the act).
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adversely affected by asbestos.162 An administrative staff would
run the compensation fund163 and process asbestos claims on a nofault basis and in a nonadversarial setting.164 The administrative
staff would promulgate procedures for filing claims and establish a
payment schedule based on a claimant’s injuries and medical
history.165 The FAIR Act’s compensation model would establish a
$140 billion compensation fund.166 Defendant companies, their
insurers, and prior asbestos defendants’ bankruptcy trusts would be
the primary financiers of the compensation fund.167 Recovery
under the fund would be disbursed according to a tiered
compensation schedule.168 Compensation would range from
$25,000 for claimants requiring medical monitoring to $1.1 million
for claimants diagnosed with mesothelioma.169
Unfortunately, Congress did not enact the FAIR Act due to
immense pressure from political and business groups.170 Critics
believed that the compensation fund’s no-fault model would
increase claims by individuals without serious asbestos injuries.171
Critics also feared the rise in claims would bankrupt the
compensation fund and require a federal bailout of the fund.172
Conversely, legislators felt that the fund’s compensation levels did
162. Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006, S. 3274, 109th Cong.
§ 2 (2006) (“[The purpose of this Act is to] create a privately funded, publicly
administered fund to provide the necessary resources for a fair and efficient
system to resolve asbestos injury claims that will provide compensation for
legitimate present and future claimants of asbestos exposure as provided in this
Act.”).
163. Id. § 101 (“There is established within the Department of Labor the Office
of Asbestos Disease Compensation, which shall be headed by an Administrator.”).
164. Id. § 112.
165. Id. § 101 (“[The Administrator shall be responsible for] promulgating
such rules, regulations, and procedures as may be necessary and appropriate to
implement the provisions of this Act.”).
166. Id. § 221.
167. Id. §§ 201–226 (outlining the contributors and payment methods under
the Asbestos Injury Resolution Fund).
168. Id. § 233.
169. Stephen Labaton, Asbestos Bill is Sidelined by the Senate, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/15/politics/15
asbestos.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5088&en=8818b422c430a43a&ex=129765960
0&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.
170. Id.
171. 152 CONG. REC. S837, 838–39 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Cornyn).
172. Id.; see also The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006:
Hearing on S. 3274 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 15 (2006)
(statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Council on Foreign Relations)
(arguing that a future Congress will most likely use taxpayer dollars to bail out the
fund instead of reducing claim values or heightening eligibility standards).
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not properly punish defendants and their insurers.173 Furthermore,
financial actuaries argued the fund failed to subrogate workers’
compensation claims and allowed claimants to double dip in both
state workers’ compensation programs and the compensation
fund.174
Asbestos defendants also split on their support for the FAIR
Act. Defendants facing massive asbestos liability, like McDermott
International and United States Gypsum, stated that a no-fault
compensation system allowed them to compensate claimants while
avoiding anywhere from $600,000 to $3 billion in litigation
costs.175 On the other hand, defendants with limited asbestos
liability argued that payment obligations under compensation
funds bail out large corporations while punishing small
businesses.176 The intense backlash from political and business
critics ultimately led to the failure of the FAIR Act on February 14,
2006, when the Act failed to survive a budget objection in the
Senate.177
At this point, the possibility of a federal scheduled
compensation plan looks grim. Since Senator Specter’s attempt to
pass the landmark legislation in 2006, no legislator has proposed
the FAIR Act again. Thus, the asbestos litigation crisis seems to
continue without any federal solution in sight. Calls still remain for
a scheduled compensation plan, similar to that proposed by the
FAIR Act.178 Therefore, in an effort to combat federal inactivity,
states must enact scheduled compensation. In the wake of Rando,
Louisiana has a prime opportunity to be the proving ground for
state-administered scheduled compensation by enacting a
scheduled compensation plan based on the substantive principles in
173. Labaton, supra note 169.
174. See Current Issues in Asbestos Litigation, ISSUE BRIEF (Am. Acad. of
Actuaries, Washington, D.C.) Feb. 2006, at 8 (noting the Academy’s letter to
Senators Specter and Leahy regarding the risk of double dipping by plaintiffs in
the Fair Act’s compensation fund and workers’ compensation programs).
175. See Julie Creswell, Large and Small Businesses Part Ways on Asbestos
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2006. United States Gypsum’s parent company, USG,
stated that an administrative compensation scheduled would save them roughly $3
billion in litigation costs. McDermott International stated that a compensation
schedule would save them roughly $600,000 in litigation costs.
176. Id. (noting the financial difficulties imposed on smaller corporate
defendants A.W. Chesterton and Hopeman Brothers by the FAIR Act’s required
payments).
177. Labaton, supra note 169.
178. See, e.g., Gelinas, supra note 161 (discussing the reasons why Congress
should enact a scheduled compensation system); see also Christopher J. O’Malley,
Breaking Asbestos Litigation’s Chokehold on the American Judiciary, 2008 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1101, 1123 (2008) (discussing the benefits of a scheduled
compensation system).

780

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

the FAIR Act and the procedural framework of the Louisiana
Medical Malpractice Act.179
B. The Need for State Administered Scheduled Compensation
1. A Fair Recovery System for All Parties Through Scheduled
Compensation
Scheduled compensation solves many of the problems
associated with asbestos litigation while fairly balancing the
interests of plaintiffs, defendants, and attorneys. For plaintiffs, the
establishment of a compensation fund possesses several
advantages. Scheduled compensation ensures timely and
appropriate recovery for plaintiffs suffering from an asbestos
injury in a no-fault system.180 In the traditional tort system,
plaintiffs are often forced to file suit against multiple defendants to
gain adequate recovery.181 The need for plaintiffs to sue multiple
defendants to gain adequate recovery often results in difficult
proximate cause questions for plaintiffs.182 These questions often
force plaintiffs to use nontraditional tort theories, such as market
share and alternative liability, to prove causation.183 Louisiana and
179. See discussion infra Part III.B.3 (explaining the procedural framework of
the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act and its possible application in a Louisiana
Scheduled Asbestos Compensation Plan).
180. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMM. ON ASBESTOS LITIG., REP. OF THE
AD HOC COMM. 33 (1991) (noting the importance of establishing timely and
appropriate compensation for plaintiffs suffering from a legally cognizable
asbestos injury in an administrative compensation system).
181. See White, supra note 33, at 368–69 (noting the need for asbestos
plaintiffs to file suit against numerous defendants due to bankruptcies induced by
asbestos litigation costs).
182. The identification problem stems from two causes. First, many asbestos
products carry no manufacturer's label. Second, plaintiffs often are exposed to
several different asbestos products in their workplace, resulting in causation by
multiple defendants and an inability to recall specific manufacturers. See Jeffrey
C. Endress & Stephen G. Sozio, Market Share Liability: A One Theory Approach
Beyond DES, 1 DET. C.L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1983); see also Case v. Fibreboard Corp.,
743 P.2d 1062, 1066–67 (Okla. 1987) (describing how identification of an
asbestos manufacturer is almost impossible when the materials were installed
years before the plaintiff’s exposure).
183. See George v. Hous. Auth., 906 So. 2d 1282, 1287 (La. Ct. App. 2005)
(stating that “[m]arket share liability imposes pro rata liability in the ratio of
market share of each manufacturer of a fungible product that is so generic that the
individual manufacturer cannot be identified. The key element enabling
complainants to recover under the market share theory in a fungible products case
is the shift of the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendantmanufacturers, requiring them to show that they did not manufacture the offending
product.”); see also Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66, 68–69 (Tex. 1989)
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other jurisdictions, though, do not welcome market share or
alternative liability, and many plaintiffs suffering from cognizable
asbestos injuries are denied recovery because they cannot meet the
causation burden.184
Furthermore, the allocation of damages across multiple parties
also poses risks for many plaintiffs. For example, many states have
adopted comparative fault schemes that allocate a percentage of
fault to each liable party.185 The rash of asbestos-related
bankruptcies has led to a massive number of insolvent
defendants.186 In addition, plaintiffs cannot always identify all the
defendants contributing to their injury.187 As a result, plaintiffs’
damages awards may shrink significantly if a large percentage of
liability is apportioned to an insolvent or absent defendant.188
Plaintiffs’ recoveries are also significantly diminished by the
contingency fees under their representation contracts with
attorneys.189 Therefore, the traditional tort system fails plaintiffs
due to difficult causation burdens and the diminishment of awards
by comparative fault systems and contingency fees.

(noting that “[a]lternative liability . . . relaxes the plaintiff’s burden of identifying
the actual tortfeasor and thus may allow the plaintiff to prevail when the traditional
rules of causation would prevent recovery. When independent acts of negligence
are simultaneously committed by two or more tortfeasors and only one act results
in injury, the plaintiff is relieved of his burden of proof. The burden shifts to the
defendants to exculpate themselves.”).
184. See George, 906 So. 2d at 1287 (noting that no Louisiana court has ever
endorsed the market share liability theory); see also Quick v. Murphy Oil Co., 643
So. 2d 1291, 1294 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (noting the United States Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeal’s rejection of alternative liability and Louisiana’s endorsement of
traditional tort theories).
185. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
411.182 (LexisNexis 2010); FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (Westlaw 2011) (establishing a
pure comparative fault standard allocating a percentage of fault to each liable
party); but see GA. CODE. ANN. § 51-11-7 ( Westlaw 2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, §
13 (Westlaw 2011) (establishing a comparative fault standard barring recovery to
plaintiffs who could have avoided the consequences of a defendant’s negligence
by exercising reasonable care).
186. See Plevin, Where are They Now?, supra note 35.
187. Id.
188. For a further discussion of insolvent and absent defendants in comparative
fault cases, see Gerald W. Boston, Apportionment of Harm in Tort Law: A
Proposed Restatement, 21 DAYTON L. REV. 267 (1996); Steven B. Hantler et al.,
Moving Toward the Fully Informed Jury, 3 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 46 (2005).
189. See Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 833, 841–842 (2005) (noting that plaintiffs’ lawyers charge contingency
fees in asbestos litigation ranging from 25% to 50%, with a plurality of
contingency fees charged at 40%).
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The principles of nonadversarial and administrative
adjudication of asbestos claims in the FAIR Act eliminate
causation and damages concerns for plaintiffs. Because plaintiffs
only need to show a cognizable asbestos injury, plaintiffs are not
forced to use nontraditional tort theories such as market share or
alternative liability.190 Furthermore, the establishment of a single
solvent compensation fund eliminates the need to assert numerous
claims against multiple defendants. Without the risk of an
insolvent or absentee defendant, plaintiffs’ recovery will not be
diminished in states with a comparative fault regime. Therefore,
scheduled compensation limits the causation burden for plaintiffs
while ensuring adequate recovery.
In order to counteract the massive contingency fees charged by
plaintiffs’ attorneys, scheduled compensation funds must cap
attorneys’ fees. Fee caps, however, must be weighed against the
costs and potential losses attorneys may incur by having to
adjudicate claims in an administrative scheme. By providing fees
weighed against attorney costs, a scheduled compensation plan can
reduce the incentive for strategic behavior by plaintiffs’ attorneys
and prevent attorneys from shifting Louisiana asbestos claimants
into jurisdictions without fee caps. As a result, scheduled
compensation, unlike medical criteria statutes, discourages
strategic behavior by plaintiffs’ attorneys filing asbestos claims.
Asbestos defendants and their insurers also benefit from
scheduled compensation. Defendants have paid tens of billions of
dollars for defense counsel in asbestos litigation,191 and asbestos
litigation costs will eventually total $265 billion.192 Scheduled
compensation, however, provides several remedies to lower this
cost. Scheduled compensation funds establish the required
contribution amounts from defendants, their insurers, and asbestos
defendant
bankruptcy
trusts.193
Furthermore,
scheduled
compensation allows defendants to pay contributions over a number
of years to ensure defendants’ economic viability.194 Therefore,
defendants can accurately project their asbestos liability and manage
economic resources in a way that ensures financial solvency. Most
importantly, scheduled compensation operates in a nonadversarial
setting and eliminates the need for asbestos defense counsel,195
190. Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006, S. 3274, 109th Cong.
§§ 111–115 (2006).
191. White, Future of Mass Torts, supra note 28, at 192.
192. CAROLL ET AL., supra note 28, at vii.
193. FAIR Act, S. 3274, §§ 201–226 (2006).
194. Id.
195. Id. § 101.
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which substantially limits litigation costs for asbestos defendants.196
By lowering the litigation costs of asbestos defendants and their
insurers, scheduled compensation decreases the risk of insolvency
that many asbestos defendants currently face.
2. Addressing the Criticisms of the FAIR Act
Although scheduled compensation plans possess many
benefits, political and business interests derailed scheduled
compensation at the federal level.197 Because medical criteria
statutes and consolidation fail to resolve asbestos claims
adequately,198 state-administered scheduled compensation presents
the best solution to the asbestos crisis. State-administrated
scheduled compensation, however, must adequately address the
concerns with the FAIR Act. By adopting scheduled compensation
plans that address the criticisms of the FAIR act, states can
formulate a proper solution to the asbestos crisis.
The risk that a mass influx of asbestos claim would bankrupt a
federal compensation fund was a major criticism of the FAIR
Act.199 State-administered scheduled compensation, however, can
alleviate this criticism through several measures. Although
scheduled compensation on a national level cannot turn away
claimants based on jurisdictional connection, states enacting
scheduled compensation can establish jurisdictional barriers, such
as requiring a claimant to have been exposed to asbestos within a
jurisdiction’s boundaries.200 By establishing jurisdictional barriers,
a state compensation fund can eliminate claims for minor asbestos
injuries that have no significant connection to the state. In addition,
states must require plaintiffs to produce prima facie medical
evidence in order to recover compensation. Unlike the prima facie
requirements imposed by medical criteria statutes, which exclude
minor asbestos injuries, states can establish guidelines for asserting
minor asbestos injury claims such as asbestos exposure requiring
196. See Creswell, supra note 175 (noting the decrease in litigation costs for
asbestos defendants under an administrative compensation schedule).
197. See supra Part III.A (discussing the FAIR Act and its failure due to
political and business criticisms).
198. See supra Part II (discussing the inadequacy of consolidation and medical
criteria statutes in solving the asbestos litigation crisis).
199. Creswell, supra note 175.
200. Although medical criteria statutes ultimately do not properly adjudicate
asbestos claims for other reasons, the provisions within them establishing
jurisdictional barriers should be included within a state administered scheduled
compensation plan. For an example of jurisdictional barriers enacted under
medical criteria statutes, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 774.205 (Westlaw 2011); GA.
CODE ANN. § 51-14-9(a) (Westlaw 2011).
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medical monitoring and difficulty in breathing. By establishing
guidelines for minor asbestos injuries, as opposed to simply
excluding such claims, states can weed out meritless claims while
still providing recovery for minor and major asbestos injuries. The
inclusion of minor asbestos injury claims in a compensation
schedule also reduces the need for plaintiffs to migrate claims to
other jurisdictions. Through significant exposure and medical
evidence requirements, states can limit meritless claims and ensure
their compensation fund’s solvency.
The effect of scheduled compensation on workers’
compensation covering asbestos injuries is another major concern.
Critics of the FAIR Act claimed that a federal compensation fund
encouraged plaintiffs to double dip into both the fund and workers’
compensation systems, which allows workers’ compensation
coverage for asbestos injuries.201 This concern is important after
Rando because the Louisiana Supreme Court allowed recovery in
only workers’ compensation for individuals stricken with
asbestosis.202 Workers’ compensation systems, however, are
generally administered at the state level.203 Therefore, while the
FAIR Act did not prevent double dipping in state workers’
compensation schemes, state legislatures can certainly prevent
double dipping between a state’s workers’ compensation system
and compensation fund.
States can prevent double dipping by enacting exclusivity
clauses similar to the clauses found in most workers’ compensation
statutes. By mirroring the exclusivity clauses found in workers’
compensation statutes, state legislatures can enact exclusivity
clauses barring recovery from the compensation fund when a
claimant has already recovered under a state’s workers’
compensation scheme.204 In addition, exclusivity clauses should
201. See Current Issues in Asbestos Litigation, ISSUE BRIEF (Am. Acad. of
Actuaries, Washington, D.C.) Feb. 2006, at 8 (noting the Academy’s letter to
Senators Specter and Leahy regarding the risk of double dipping by plaintiffs in
the Fair Act’s compensation fund and workers’ compensation programs).
202. See Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 16 So. 3d 1065, 1080 (La. 2009)
(noting that the 1952 Occupation Disease Amendment only provided recovery for
injuries related to asbestosis).
203. See Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and
the Second Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace,
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 469, 493 (1993) (noting that workers’ compensation for
most Americans is a state law and explaining the traditional role of workers’
compensation at the state level); see also Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451
U.S. 504, 524 (1981) (noting that workers’ compensation rewards are subject to
the state’s police power).
204. For an example of an exclusivity clause under worker’s compensation, see
LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1032 (2010).
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bar recovery in workers’ compensation for claims adjudicated
under a scheduled compensation plan. Because states can exert
control over their workers’ compensation system and asbestos
compensation fund, state-administered scheduled compensation
can adequately address the workers’ compensation concerns of the
FAIR Act’s critics.
Most importantly, scheduled compensation, unlike medical
criteria statutes, promotes self-sufficiency in adjudicating asbestos
claims. While medical criteria statutes do not adjudicate the
majority of asbestos cases,205 scheduled compensation quickly
determines the merits of all claims and grants the necessary
compensation for claims showing a cognizable asbestos injury.206
By providing an efficient means of adjudicating minor and major
asbestos injuries within a jurisdiction, scheduled compensation
reduces the need for plaintiffs to seek out other jurisdictions to
adjudicate their claims. Therefore, state-administered scheduled
compensation actually reduces asbestos litigation as opposed to
shifting asbestos litigation into other jurisdictions. Thus, scheduled
compensation not only efficiently solves jurisdictions’ asbestos
litigation problems, but it also achieves this end without sacrificing
the judicial efficiency of other states.
The massive amount of claims currently pending in the court
system, as well as a possible rash of claims prior to a scheduled
compensation plan’s enactment, require compensation plans to
achieve two necessary ends. First, scheduled compensation plans
must subrogate previously filed claims into scheduled
compensation. Second, jurisdictions must establish scheduled
compensation as the sole remedy for all future asbestos injury
claims. One method that can achieve these ends is to retroactively
apply a scheduled compensation plan to previously filed claims.
Unfortunately, states with medical criteria statutes have held
retroactivity unconstitutional.207 This does not mean, however, that
retroactivity clauses cannot work in a scheduled compensation
system. In decisions that overturned retroactivity provisions in
medical criteria statutes, courts in Georgia and Florida specifically
addressed cases where a lack of prima facie evidence under the
medical criteria statute retroactively dismissed or shifted asbestos
205. See supra Part II.B (discussing the inability of medical criteria statutes to
adequately adjudicate claims).
206. The term “cognizable asbestos injury” includes not only physical asbestos
injuries such as mesothelioma and asbestosis but also economic asbestos injuries
such as medical costs requiring medical monitoring damages.
207. See supra note 154 (outlining the decisions of courts in Florida, Georgia,
and Ohio on the retroactive application of medical criteria statutes).
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claims onto an inactive docket.208 Retroactivity clauses in a
scheduled compensation plan, however, do not retroactively
dismiss or impede a claim’s adjudication. Instead, retroactivity
preserves and shifts claims into an administrative adjudication
scheme. Therefore, courts may not strike down retroactivity,
because scheduled compensation gives plaintiffs a lower burden of
proof and does not retroactively dismiss claims for minor asbestos
injuries. Furthermore, if courts do strike down retroactive
application, legislation making scheduled compensation the sole
remedy for all future asbestos injury claims still offers a proper
solution for future asbestos litigation in a jurisdiction. When
combined with legislation making scheduled compensation the
sole remedy for asbestos injuries, retroactivity clauses adequately
shift pending and future claims into the compensation schedule.
While retroactivity concerns pose difficulties for scheduled
compensation, Louisiana law likely enables the retroactive
application of a scheduled compensation plan. The Louisiana Civil
Code addresses the retroactive application of procedural and
substantive laws.209 The Civil Code retroactively applies
procedural laws while allowing retroactive application of
substantive laws when intended by the legislature.210 Scheduled
compensation makes procedural and substantive changes to
asbestos recovery. As a result, scheduled compensation can apply
retroactively, provided that the Louisiana legislature establishes a
clear intent to retroactively apply the substantive portions of a
scheduled compensation plan.
3. The Louisiana Scheduled Asbestos Compensation Plan
The final hurdle for state administered scheduled compensation
is the establishment of the compensation fund and its procedural
framework. Although the idea of a state administered
compensation fund may seem foreign to many, states already
administer compensation plans in other litigation arenas. For
example, the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act establishes a
statutory recovery cap with payment through a Patients’
Compensation Fund.211 The Medical Malpractice Act also provides
208. Id.
209. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 6 (2010) (“In the absence of contrary
legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and
interpretative laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a
legislative expression to the contrary.”).
210. See supra note 154.
211. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.44 (2010) (establishing a Patient’s
Compensation Fund for victims of medical malpractice in Louisiana).
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guidelines for collecting contributions to the fund and establishes
procedural mechanisms for resolving medical malpractice suits.212
Under the statute, plaintiffs’ claims are first adjudicated by a
medical review panel.213 The medical review panel’s determination
is not a final adjudication, and plaintiffs may file an action in the
court system after the review panel renders its decision.214 The
medical review panel’s decision is not binding on the trial court,
but it is submitted to the trial court as expert testimony.215
The Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act provides a sound
procedural framework for a state-administered asbestos scheduled
compensation plan. Of course, the framework provided by the
Medical Malpractice Act must be slightly modified to achieve the
goals of scheduled compensation. Like the Medical Malpractice
Act, Louisiana’s scheduled compensation system should adjudicate
all asbestos claims through an administrative asbestos review
panel. In an asbestos review panel, claimants will need to assert
only prima facie medical evidence of a legally cognizable asbestos
injury.216 However, the asbestos review panel, unlike medical
review panels, will operate in a nonadversarial setting, and its
determination will be binding upon claimants.217 Because the
Louisiana Constitution provides the right to an appeal for all
decisions affecting the rights and property of individuals, asbestos
review panel decisions should be appealable to a state court.218 The

212. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.44(A)(5) (2010) (establishing procedures
for collecting funds from contributors to the Patient’s Compensation Fund).
213. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (2010). Medical Review Panels are
the first step in the adjudication of a medical malpractice action in Louisiana.
Malpractice claims must first go through the medical review panel, and claims
filed in court prior to a determination by the medical review panel are dismissed as
untimely. The Medical Review Panels consist of three healthcare professionals
and are chaired by a nonvoting attorney member. Id.
214. Id.
215. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1299.47(H) (2010) (“Any report of the expert
opinion reached by the medical review panel shall be admissible as evidence in
any action subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of law, but such expert
opinion shall not be conclusive[.]”).
216. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1299.47 (2010). In medical review panels,
plaintiffs are required to prove (1) the standard of care of their treating physician,
(2) a breach of the standard of care, and (3) causation between the breach and the
plaintiff’s injury. Under a Louisiana scheduled compensation plan, a legally
cognizable asbestos injury would include all physical and economic injuries
caused by asbestos exposure.
217. Id. Medical Review Panels are adversarial in nature, and plaintiffs and
defendants present evidence regarding the standard of care and breach of that
standard by the healthcare physician.
218. LA. CONST. art. I, § 19.
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panel’s decisions, however, should be given deference by the
appellate court in order to limit the number of appeals filed.
While the Medical Malpractice Act provides a sound
procedural framework for a Louisiana scheduled compensation
system, the FAIR Act provides the necessary substantive basis for
a Louisiana system through its nonadversarial and no-fault method.
By combining the procedural framework of the Medical
Malpractice Act with the substantive provisions of the FAIR Act,
Louisiana can establish a fair scheduled compensation system that
adequately compensates plaintiffs while limiting the litigation
costs of asbestos defendants and the state.
V. CONCLUSION
The impending consequences of the Rando decision require
legislative action. The combination of the federal government’s
failure to enact asbestos litigation reform and the negative impacts
of other jurisdictions’ solutions leaves the responsibility of
combating asbestos litigation squarely on the shoulders of the
Louisiana legislature. This problem provides Louisiana the
opportunity to be at the forefront of combating asbestos litigation
at the state level. Louisiana and other states must answer this call
by enacting a scheduled compensation system that adopts the
suggestions provided in this Comment to efficiently adjudicate
asbestos claims. Louisiana has the opportunity to create a
scheduled compensation model that is fair to plaintiffs, defendants,
attorneys, and the court system. Therefore, the Louisiana
legislature must enact a scheduled compensation plan to combat
asbestos litigation’s stranglehold on the judicial system.
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